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We hear a question. Anything could happen. A world filled with promise, terror, 
boredom, love, work (so much work) and sometimes surprises. We might go to the park. 
We might have to fill in an evaluation form. We might find ourselves daydreaming. We 
might stay silent under interrogation. We might start our journey home. We might go 
shopping for food for dinner. We might say we don’t know. We really might not know. 
 
For the pair, for us as a pair, fitted together, similar yet not exchangeable, like a left shoe 
and a right shoe, the question finds it relevance in a long standing task, to write a paper 
where we might finally place our conceptual equipment side-by-side. As left follows 
right and right follows left, in this paper we will walk through our singular and shared 
studies in the poetic, political and practical programmatic legacies of Michel Foucault 
and ethnomethodology . More particularly we will follow the faltering steps that Chris 
has taken in the pathways of Foucault’s arguably most difficult book, L’archaeologies du 
savoir (tran.s The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1972) : see Philo, 1989) together 
with steps that Eric has more recently followed with the disparate travelling band that is  
ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967; Garfinkel & Sacks 1970; Garfinkel & Wieder 1992; 
Lynch 1993). Previously we have collaborated in examining the work of others, notably 
Bruno Latour (Laurier & Philo 1999), and in the analysis of empirical materials such as 
the daily routines of car-based workers (Laurier & Philo 2003). Up until now, we have 
refrained from too close an inspection of one another’s intellectual backgrounds, 
resources and commitments. What sense does it make to ask the right foot what the left 
does next? The next step is made in the walking. Yet there is value in the kind of exercise 
that makes available for our investigation what the ‘other’ foot does, such as when we try 
to dance our partner’s steps or kick a ball with the other foot. Our pause for inspection 
may hold some interest for other geographers wondering about the conceptual 
manoeuvres that may come to invigorate endeavour within (and beyond the discipline). 
We say this less because we suppose there to be some special ‘answer’ in conjoining 
Foucault’s archaeology with Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology – although maybe there is 
something novel to be said here – and more because it may be in the principle of 
conversations between different styles of thinking, hybridisations of topical concerns and, 
most of all, ways of investigating, that ‘what next’ will reside. 
 
For us in the event of writing this we hear ‘what next’ as something we have been 
planning ought to happen. It means we will finally begin considering the affinities and 
complementarities between Foucauldian historical investigations and the studies of 
practical action and practical reasoning, otherwise known as ethnomethodology. 
Foucault’s work has been enthusiastically absorbed by numerous disciplines, raising his 
status and influence on the humanities and social science to the degree where he is 
thought of in some quarters as the Karl Marx of the twentieth century. By comparison, 
ethnomethodology has been treated as something of a curiosity in the development of the 
social sciences, its practitioners pursuing ‘studies’ with a missionary zeal and dismissing 
attempts to integrate their findings, methods or conceptual clarifications into other 
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programmes of social, cultural and psychological research1. Their studies are, by their 
self-assessment, asymmetrically alternate to, it would seem, any other kind of project in 
the social sciences: ‘[t]he following of the methodologies of one makes the other 
‘disappear’: the methodologies are radical alternatives to each other, fundamentally 
disjunctive rather than being complimentary or reconcilable by means of an additive 
formula which juxtaposes and purportedly articulates the two’ (Watson 1994; p177). 
With such warnings about the ethno-inquiries of Garfinkel, Sacks and others in mind, we 
nevertheless wish to argue in sympathy with McHoul (1986; 1996) for the particular 
appropriateness of reconciling ethnomethodology with the work of Foucault. Indeed as 
Watson (1994; p117) continues, ‘there can certainly be no a priori objection to each and 
any reconciliation, as much of course depends upon the logic of the particular cases in 
point’2. We might in fact argue that by its very popularity, Foucault’s work has suffered 
much more than ethnomethodology from being skimmed for its ‘big ideas’ (i.e. 
panopticism in particular, see Philo 1992 where Chris complains about the only Foucault 
known to geographers being ‘the geometer of power’.), then affiliated and all too often 
inappropriately added to various theoretical frameworks in the social sciences and 
cultural studies. 
 
In our daily research practice, then, we find our footing in these two distinctive ways of 
pursuing empirically-bound investigations of classical topics of philosophy, human 
geography, history, sociology, critical theory and so on. By our own convenient 
shorthands for one another’s approaches we have traded on a division between Foucault’s 
forms of self-serious discourse in circulation and ethnomethodology’s attention to 
common or garden spatial phenomena and talk-in-interaction. By contrasting the two 
each has given us purchase where the other starts to let slip, since ethnomethodology is 
the programme ‘par excellence that has been able to generate detailed findings about 
concrete social situations and the forms of semiosis that produce them (and that, 
reflexively, they produce). On the other hand, Foucauldian discourse analysis has been 
superbly capable of situating discourse in terms of its general effectivity as means of 
producing (and being produced by forms of knowledge, power and subjectivity in their 
broadest historical senses’ (McHoul 1996). This observation comes Alec McHoul’s 
(McHoul 1986; McHoul 1996) illuminating remarks on the ‘two quite theoretically 
distinct sociologies’ (1986, p65) of Garfinkel and Foucault. In an exploration of the 
public methods for passing on the private knowledge of sexuality, McHoul considers 
both ‘touchstones’ for the two traditions, and the elements of each which are 
incommensurate. His ambition for his own ‘semiotic investigations’ is that they should be 
able to stretch from the ‘situational’, via the ‘social’, to the ‘historical’ (McHoul, 1996, 
p101). It is in McHoul’s initial meeting of ethnomethods and discourses that the term 
                                                 
1 If there is one substantial gain to be had from ethnomethodology meeting human geography it is that there 
has not been an antagonistic history in previous encounters in stark contrast to its dark status in other social 
sciences. 
2 It is highly appropriate to set Rod Watson and Alec McHoul’s remarks on ethnomethodology side by side 
since Watson has perhaps most clearly expressed why ethnomethodology cannot straightforwardly be 
added to, or combined with, other approaches  (Watson 1992). McHoul, at one time Watson’s student and 
to whom Semiotic Investigations is McHoul’s ‘answer – for Rod – though I don’t doubt he’ll disagree with 
it’ (1996, pxxii), has by contrast made a singular and nuanced argument as to the post-structural approaches 
to which ethnomethodology could fruitfully be aligned. 
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‘ethnogenealogy’ is coined and we make no special point in calling our follow-up to his 
lead, ‘ethnoarchaeology’. McHoul uses archaeology and genealogy interchangeably in 
his essay and Chris equally has argued, contra Deleuze and others, for the continuity 
between Foucault’s archaeologies and genealogies. Indeed we remain somewhat wary of 
giving a name at all to ‘what next’ for reasons that will become clear a little later. 
 
To follow the straightforward division of their strengths put forward by McHoul, 
Foucault provides a historicism which ethnomethodology lacks. From the other side, 
ethnomethodology localises what otherwise become grand periodisations from Foucault’s 
histories. As Chris has emphasised from the outset (Philo 1992) to follow the examples 
set in Foucault’s historical geographies entails the avoidance of ‘total histories’ in favour 
of what he terms ‘general histories’; a disavowal of grand-theoretical simplifications, 
even as he is ready to provide ‘big picture’ historical surveys, and a preference for 
‘untidy’ inquiries where chaos and incommensurability in the stuff of the inquiries are 
readily foregrounded. Whilst retaining a wariness over the theoretical ambitions of 
Foucauldian studies, Lynch, one of the figures in ethnomethodology alongside McHoul 
willing to hybridise it, if cautiously and critically, with other disciplines3, points toward 
this same contrast: 
 
Foucault’s descriptions nevertheless can be exemplary for ethnomethodological 
investigations, because they so clearly identify how material architectures, 
machineries, bodily techniques, and disciplinary routines make up coherent 
phenomenal fields. Whereas Foucault problematises the diachronic continuity of 
historical discourses, ethnomethodology explodes the contemporaneous landscape 
of language games into distinctive orders of practice, which are neither 
hermetically sealed from one another nor expressive of a single historical narrative. 
(Lynch 1993) p131 
 
In what follows we will sketch out a basis, building on McHoul and Lynch’s first steps, 
for ethnoarchaeologies to follow, since what we are doing here is not an exhibition of an 
ethnoarchaeological study. Our ambition is to fashion a series of specific hinges around 
which we will swing between Foucault’s ‘archaeology’ and Garfinkel & Sack’s 
‘ethnomethodology’ ; and we will deliberately mix up our discussions of each, avoiding 
setting them out in stark contrast to one another. It should be underlined that our reading 
of the Archaeology of Knowledge is through the lens provided by in the English edition’s 
Preface, which was written round about the same time as ‘Nietzsche, la généalogie, 
l’histoire’  (Foucault 1971), wherein Foucault talks of the boring, grey task of historical 
work. At this point in Foucault’s development ‘archaeology’ and ‘genealogy’ look much 
the same, as descriptions of a stance before history and its traces, whereas subsequently 
‘genealogy’ begin to look more like an empirical grasp on the workings and lineages of 
power, though once again we would not wish to overplay a decisive split on Foucault’s 
oeuvre. 
                                                 
3 Ethmethodologists have always been happy to hybridise with practitioners such as the police, film-
makers, jazz players, astronomers, truckers, lawyers, builders, engineers, nurses and designers, pursuing 
studies grounded in the vernacular expertise of those groups which are uniquely adequate rather than 




‘We’ll call it ethno-archaeology’: formal properties and rules 
 
As with so many snappy titles foisted on larger intellectual projects, like ‘deconstruction’ 
or ‘actor-network theory’,  ‘ethnomethodology’, while not all that snappy, since it is 
double dipthonged and polysyllabic, has allowed for short definitions which make 
something arguable and locatable in a literature of the social, cultural and historical 
disciplines while ignoring its rich corpora. Interviewed on the origins and meaning of the 
term, Garfinkel was characteristically spikey: 
 
‘I am going to tell you right now that I cannot be held responsible for what persons 
have come to make of ethnomethodology. Here I am talking about 
‘ethnomethodology’, because there are now quite a number of persons who, on a 
day-to-day basis, are doing studies of practical activities, of common-sense 
knowledge, of this and that, and of practical organizational reasoning. That is what 
ethnomethodology is concerned with. It is an organizational study of a member’s 
knowledge of his ordinary affairs, of her own organized enterprises, where that 
knowledge is treated by us as part of the same setting that it also makes orderable… 
one way to start this meeting would be to say, ‘we’ve stopped using 
ethnomethodology. We are now going to call it “neopraxiology”.’ That would at 
least make it clear to whoever wants the term ethnomethodology, for whatever you 
want it for, go ahead and take it. You might as well since our studies will remain 
without that term. I think the term may, in fact, be a mistake. It has acquired a kind 
of life of its own.’ (Garfinkel 1974) 
 
Similarly, the ‘archaeology of knowledge’ offers a name which has tended to supplant the 
body of work, to be wondered about in isolation, to start generating questions about 
Foucault’s efforts that might be seen as quite misplaced were his collection of substantive 
studies consulted. Also it ignores the specifity of the Archaeology of Knowledge, as a 
‘topical’ study of how enduring knowledge is made (and archived) ; as such, it is not 
straightforwardly a window on to Foucault’s methodology although there are elements 
that can be extracted  from the Archaeology of Knowledge to stand as more programmatic 
claims about history and our attempts to excavate it. Rather than implying the unearthing 
of the foundations on which knowledge rests, Foucault’s use of ‘archaeology’ was related 
to the slow removal of soil with delicate hand-tools, the trowelling, picking and brushing 
away of dirt, to reveal the shape of the object normally surrounded by soil. Thus it is a 
title that refers analogously to the investigator’s practice rather than to a more metaphoric 
sense of digging down (we will return to this depth metaphor later when discussing 
‘surfaces’ and ‘visibility’). Various writers, Deleuze (1988) amongst them, talk about the 
Archaeology of Knowledge as summarising Foucault’s ‘archaeological’ approach as 
taken in his inquiries up until this book; they distinguish this phase in his work from a 
later ‘genealogical’ approach hung up on the hinges of power. We would remain at best 
cautious about such a division in Foucault’s progress and at worst see it as misleading. It 
can throw readers off the track in the same way that the over-emphasized switch in 
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Wittgenstein’s work between the Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1961 (orig.1922)) and the 
Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953) all too often does (Hacker 1989; Hacker 
2000). 
 
A point of juxtaposition between ethno-inquiries and archaeologies to begin with is that 
Foucault attained a philosophical vantage point that rejected any commitment to 
naturalism or any employment of formal language systems, while ethno-inquiries are 
committed to naturalistic studies and are centrally concerned with formal structures of 
practical actions. Might this however not be quite the disjunction it appears to be? Firstly 
let us register the distance that separates Foucault’s view of discourse from the heritage 
of structural linguistics and semiology that was, at one point, posited as the fundamental 
and fashioning tap-root of his particular project. Perry Anderson, for instance, placed 
Foucault beside Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan as structuralists or neo-structuralists 
still writing squarely in the space opened up by Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics 
and as fellow antagonists of the Marxist heritage of historical materialism. A more 
sophisticated inquiry is erected by Alex Callinicos, who, like Anderson, was concerned to 
avert modern philosophical assaults on Marxism. Although he, and Megill (1985), put 
much more emphasis on the Nietzschean heritage in the thinking of Foucault and 
Deleuze, they nonetheless portray Foucault quite clearly as an heir of the revolution of 
language marked out by Saussure’s decisive break with earlier classical doctrines of 
language. The claims advanced by Anderson, Callinicos and Megill certainly contain 
many seeds of truth, but we would still argue that the original version of structural 
linguistics and even the later appropriations of that vision by various French theorists 
evince a naturalism and formalism that is rarely seen in the pages of Foucault’s many 
texts. Even though Foucault may no longer be taken to be a latter day Saussurean 
semiologist, he is still mis-characterised as searching for Discourse which is taken to be a 
system like ‘la langue’ of Saussure’s langue/parole structural binary. As he locates his 
work in one interview: 
 
‘I am at the difference from those we call structuralists for I am not very interested 
in the formal possibilities offered by a system like language (la langue). Personally, 
I am above all haunted by the existence of discourses; by the fact that speaking has 
taken place as events in relation to their original situation, and that they have left 
behind traces which continue to exist and exercise in their very subsistence internal 
to history, a certain number of manifest or secret functions’. 
 
Clearly then Foucault warns off those who would place him amongst the structuralists. 
He is signalling his concern for speaking as an event which can only be made proper 
sense of by placing it in its original situation. Too much weight should not be put upon 
‘secret’ in his remark since the function of speech in its place is secret only in so much as 
it not immediately available to us in the way we might understand the same speech in our 
situation today and so it requires the careful re-articulation of the statement into the local 
historical conditions which made it possible. Deleuze expresses Foucault’s grasp on what 
is hidden from view most eloquently: 
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‘That everything is always said in every age is perhaps Foucault’s greatest 
historical principle: behind the curtain there is nothing to see, but it was all the 
more important each time to describe the curtain, or the base, since there was 
nothing behind it nor beneath it’ (Deleuze 1988a) p54. 
 
Where Foucault emphasises his disinterest in the formal possibilities of language, 
Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) are deeply interested in formal structures but indifferent to 
any principled distinction between professional sociological (or psychological or cultural 
or historical) reasoning and ‘legal reasoning, conversational reasoning, divinational 
reasoning, psychiatric reasoning, and the rest’(Garfinkel & Sacks 1970). So, although 
sharing what might be called a constructionist attitude to social activities, ‘the two 
understand formal structures differently and in incompatible ways’ (Garfinkel & Sacks 
1986; p165). From a cursory reading of the published work in conversational analysis 
(CA) in particular it has been easy for critics to imply that it is a formal account of just 
the kind that Foucault, and many other post-structuralists, would want to dispute. Both 
Garfinkel and Sacks were fond of tables, diagrams and unusual textual renderings of 
phenomena (see fig. 1) which could easily be confused with an attempt to create formal, 
cohort-independent models, rules or laws. However, Garfinkel, in particular, would use 
such diagrams to demonstrate the inescapable loss of a phenomenon by any rendering 
practices and to make the rendering process (the ‘curtains’ of scientific methodology as it 
were) visible. At a more conceptual level ethnomethodology collapses the semiotic 
binary which Saussure used, showing through frequent perspicuous examples that la 
langue does not exist outside of its use in parole. It follows Wittgenstein’s later dismissal 
of the possibility that we should use ladders to climb up out of ordinary language 
(Wittgenstein 1980). Garfinkel and Sacks, in their (only) joint paper, argue that practices, 
language games, workplaces, everyday life have the very possibility of their existence, 
comprehensibility and analysability ‘(a) in that they exhibit upon analysis the properties 
of uniformity, reproducibility, repetitiveness, standardization, typicality and so on; (b) in 
that these properties are independent of particular production cohorts; (c) in that 
particular cohort independence is a phenomenon for members’ recognition; and (d) in 
that the phenomenon (a), (b), and (c) are every particular cohort’s practical situated 
accomplishment’ (Garfinkel & Sacks 1986; p166).  
 
Hopefully it is becoming apparent that ethnomethodology develops a very odd kind of 
interest in formal properties which does not seek its own formal system that would 
liberate, democratise, correct, perfect or ironicise existing practice (contra say 
Habermas’s (1980) search for the ideal speech situation). Sacks in his (1963) paper on 
sociological description critiqued the ‘ironic’ stance of classical sociology, for applying 
external standards that, as Watson puts it, is ‘derived from the formal categories or 
procedures of science, or, worse, an idealized version of them. All too often, this results 
in commonsense understandings being deemed primitively deficient, superficial, 
misconceived, inadequate, interested, stereotypical, mystificatory – in short as an inferior, 
naïve or degenerate version of what is yielded by the (idealized) scientific approach’ 
(Watson 1994; p173) . Clearly then this a situation very close to Foucault’s own; disjunct 
from similar ‘ironic’ structuralist formalisations of language; it foregrounds background 
expectations and dispersed ‘serious’ techniques of ordering. On this basis we would 
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argue that it would be a mistake to oppose Foucault and ethnomethodology on the basis 




Fig. 1 ‘Summoning phones’ from (Garfinkel & Wieder 1992) 
 
Moreover, Foucault embraces a conception of rules and laws similar to that of 
ethnomethodology, since he clearly rejects any attempt to propose ‘cross-cultural, 
ahistorical, abstract laws’ somehow operating outside of, beyond, behind or below the 
concrete, dispersed details of particular historical and geographical conjunctures (Philo 
1992). His feeling is instead for rules as specific, local and mutable conditions of 
existence – as regularities speaking across the various levels of the enunciative field 
which are, in a sense, both statements themselves and their specific conditions of 
existence. Deleuze puts it thus: ‘A statement operates neither laterally nor vertically but 
transversally, and its rules are to be found on the same level as itself’ (Deleuze 1988a) 
p5.When such regularities are definable (and the analyst’s job is not to do the defining 
but to find definable regularities), then Foucault says ‘for the sake of convenience we are 
dealing with a discursive formation … The conditions to which the elements of this 
division (objects, modes of statements, concepts, thematic choices) are subjected we shall 
call the rules of formation. The rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of 
co-existence, maintenance, modification and disappearance) in a given discursive 
division’ (Foucault 1972, p38). By situating a statement in a discursive formation we are 
given the laws that govern it – the location of a statement and the rules for its location 
and operation are homologous.  Any ‘discursive formation is characterised not by 
principles of construction but by a dispersion of fact, since for statements, it is not a 
condition of possibility but a law of coexistence, and since statements are not 
interchangeable elements but groups characterised by their modality of existence’ 
(Foucault 1972). The details of how Foucault envisaged ‘statements’ coming together 
into recognisable discourses across the enunciative field we do not have the space to go 
into here. They are laid out in bold outline in Philo (1989), wherein some recovery of 
discourse as a distinctive order of historical reality is argued, here the point of our current 
paper is somewhat more programmatic. 
 
At this point it is worth making a further brief aside on conversation analysis (CA), which 
has emerged as one possible development of the work of Harvey Sacks. Critiques of 
CA’s drift away from the early concerns of Harvey Sacks, and perhaps more tellingly of 
ethnomethodology, toward a scientistic and formalist approach have been made by Lynch 
& Bogen (Bogen 1999; Lynch 1997). In a brief elucidation of the difference between the 
corpus of materials used by CA practitioners and the archive as used by Foucauldian 
scholars, McHoul & Grace (1995) put it thus: ‘Foucault’s archive is not just a collection 
of texts or materials … but the form of organisation of the parts of a discourse (its 
statements) … Classically, CA’s version of discourse looks for techniques of saying – 
how turns are taken in conversations, for example. By contrast, Foucault’s discourse 
theory looks for techniques of ‘what can be said’ pp30-31. In Lynch’s (1993; 2001; 1996) 
recommendations as to how Sack’s diverse collection of lectures might to be read and re-
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used by those not wishing to pursue ‘classical CA’ he pushes back toward the second 
movement in most of Sack’s (1992a; 1992b) lectures. This second reflective movement 
was toward examining a conversational fragment’s relation to what can be described, 
what can be offered as a possible story in and about the world and lead thus to question 
the very possibilities of telling, knowing, describing, seeing and doing analysis at all. 
 
The position outlined above could not be further removed from a focus on the universal, 
Humean laws and rules sought by many conventional social scientists, or indeed from a 
focus on the systematic and structural regularities sought by structuralists at the expense 
of how such regularities were (for Foucault) and are (for ethnomethdologists) made / 
produced / assembled. Against the promises of explanation from history or sociology it 
aligns Foucault’s argument that ‘archaeology is a purely descriptive enterprise’ (Foucault 
1977) with ethnomethodology’s insistently descriptive approach to language (Lynch 
1993; p199). There is no need from either position to build a second order Discourse to 
comprehend discourses, nor Meta-theory of theories. Instead there is a requirement to 
supply actual historical and social statements/activities that explode the essentialised 
meanings of power, know, reason, and so on, which develop into, as Lynch (1993) 
concludes, ‘hypostatized concepts such as Knowledge, Representation, Reason and 
Truth.’ This move toward situated, local, practical productions of, say, reasoning, or 
searching for the truth, does not entail any kind of scepticism or, worse, despair about 
truth or reason, ‘nothing could be further from the case. If an investigation attends to how 
an expression (for example, a ‘statement’ in Foucault or a ‘usage’ in Garfinkel) comes to 
be counted as true, historically or situationally, this does not mean the investigator is 
skeptical of that expression’s status as true once it has been so counted’ (McHoul 1996) 
p105.  
 
Where Foucault’s attention alighted upon the problem of documents and discourses he 
claimed that that ‘[t]he question proper to such an analysis might be formulated in this 
way : what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said and nowhere else’ 
(Foucault 1972, p28). More precisely, the researcher must ask, ‘how is it that one 
particular statement appeared rather than another?’ (Foucault 1972 p27). Foucault thus 
sets himself the task of chipping away at the limits partitioning off what is said at a 
particular time and place from what is not said. In a very real sense, he had previously 
been concerned with the investigation of these limits, but it was only in the Archaeology 
of Knowledge that he first seriously set about codifying his position explicitly, and first 
set about demonstrating – albeit in ‘the cautious stumbling manner of this text’ (Foucault 
1972, p17) – just how this position could be translated into a methodology. The outcome 
was, by his own admission, ‘a whole apparatus whose sheer weight, and, no doubt, 
somewhat bizarre machinery are a source of embarassment’ (Foucault 1972 p135). We 
would argue that is not necessary to pursue Foucault into the heart of this ‘bizarre 
machinery’, since one can easily be a competent and sensitive archeologist without 
ladening one’s analyses with the bewildering profusion of notions and terms that 
comprise this precarious edifice4. The richly textured pages of ‘Madness and Civilisation’ 
                                                 
4 Once again for reasons of space we can only footnote here the striking similarity here of the uses of 
‘machinery’ in Harvey Sack’s (1992a,b) lectures, and the recommendations of ethnomethodologists to 
beware of being drawn too deeply into giving technical names to what any competent speaker can do. 
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(Foucault 1988 (1961)), ‘The Birth of the Clinic’ and the ‘Order of Things’ readily attest 
to this fact since these texts clearly display Foucault’s archaeology at work, even though 
most of the notions and terms of the Archaeology of Knowledge are not immediately 
present. Moreover, we believe that archaeology is more of a style, a set of commitments 
to what is right there before you in its ground, than it is a starkly laid out and unequivocal 
manual of research procedures. 
 
… in Foucault as well as Garfinkel there is a common method, and this means not 
‘accepting’ social facts that must be explained after the fact; rather it means, in 
Garfinkel’s phrase, catching ‘the work of fact production in flight,’ … Passages 
from Garfinkel’s Studies on the accomplishment of social facts appear uncannily 
parallel to Foucault’s treatment of the construction of truth(s) … Both writers find 
their topics in the relation between work (activities) and conditions of possibility 
(available methods) that, in quite local circumstances, lead to certain accounts 
being heard and accepted as ‘true’ or as ‘the facts,’ where this analytic method 
contrasts with those that try to adjudicate between different account’s veridicality 
(for example, theories of ‘ideology’). (McHoul 1996) p104 
 
There is a kind of existential priority running through Foucault’s work and those of 
ethnomethodologists which constantly turns them toward studying what exists. This in no 
way minimises the access to the problem of social order since social order is taken to be 
at work at all points, particular practical solutions being produced everywhere and at all 
times. What is important is to assemble a corpus. From a properly assembled corpus an 
investigator acquires not just, say ‘data’, but how such ‘data’ is possible. As Deleuze 
argues it ‘… once the corpus has been established (which does not in any sense impose 
limits on the statement) we can then determine the way in which language [langage] 
gathers round or ‘falls’ into this corpus’ ‘ (Deleuze 1988a) p18. By way of contrast, 
structuralism studied systems which gave numerous possibilities and some 
impossibilities. If an impossibility for the system was found to exist then the system had 
to be pulled to pieces and re-assembled to be able to contain this possibility too.   
 
 
Describing appearances / the depths of surfaces 
 
Methodologically, then, it seems very difficult to stick to what is actually stated, to 
nothing but the actual inscription of what is said. Even (and above all) linguistics 
does not remain content with that, especially when its classifications are on a 
different level from what is said. (Deleuze 1988a) p15 
 
Where there are some of the most striking harmonies between Foucault’s approach to 
examining the traces of history and ethnomethodology’s orientation to explicating ‘seen 
but unnoticed’ features of the present day is in their firm resolve to face up to what is 
grossly, obviously available. As Deleuze hints above on the challenge of staying with 
what you have in hand, and several pages earlier in his the quote about examining the 
workings of ‘the curtain’, there is no need to set off on a search for the Wizard of Oz for 
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Foucault’s or for Garfinkel’s studies. Both approaches turn first to the techniques, 
technologies, practices, methods, statements and so on, that may later allow for 
characters/agents/subjects to appear as either mighty rulers, pathetic small men pulling 
levers or ‘sincere liars’ (as Lynch and Bogen (1996) call Ollie North). There is, if you 
will pardon the mild paradox, a deep concern with the surfaces of the world. As Lynch 
and Bogen express it, on the surface of the text: 
 
’In view of the fact that so much social-scientific, literary and philosophical effort 
has been devoted to getting to the bottom of discourse, our aim of sticking to the 
surface of the text may strike some readers as curious. It is our view, however, that 
any deeper readings would have to ignore the complexity and texture of the surface 
events, and thus they would fail to explicate how an order of activities is achieved 
as a contingent, moment-by-moment production’ (Lynch 1996) 
 
Neither Foucault nor ethnomethodologists use the ‘unsaid’ or the ‘subconscious’ or ‘total 
history’ or other devices that usher in invisible explanations of order. Relentlessly, even 
tediously, they are concerned with the order that is made available and is everywhere to 
be examined. There is nothing hidden although there are things that we are urged to take 
notice of, things that we have come to ignore through excessive familiarity with them in 
the archive/through witnessing, doing them and hearing them again and again on a daily 
basis. Both then are concerned with things lying in plain view, open to everyone and yet 
unexamined. Targets for Foucault’s displays of, for instance, discipline-in-action 
(Foucault 1977) are hermeneutic and structuralist studies which probe into the murky 
depths of the ‘unsaid’; the former searching for unexplained meanings, understandings 
and intentions locked in individual and group psyches, and the latter searching for the 
impersonal rules that determine how possible and actual parts of the documents 
interrogated combine together. Foucault’s analysis renders structuralist and depth 
explanations ‘invisible’ because he shows how events had to be put in place so that 
something like an ‘inner psyche’ became a historical possibility. Ethnomethodology has, 
along similar lines, dissolved questions of social order that pre-defined hidden 
superstructures to which only analysts apparently have privileged access, and they have 
also targeted varieties of psychology which seek explanations of reason and conduct in an 
only indirectly accessible inner mental/cognitive realm (Coulter 1983; Coulter 1999).  
 
Following from his distancings from hermeneutic and structuralist studies, Foucault hunts 
in the Archaeology of Knowledge, for a completely new approach to the problem of how 
to disinter some ‘reality’ from the stubborn existence of documents. He stresses the need 
to treat documents seriously on their own terms and he signposts this treatment as an 
‘archaeological excavation of documents as monuments : ‘[t]he document, then, is no 
longer for history an inert material through which it tries to reconstitute what men (sic.) 
have done or said, the events of which only the trace remains; history is trying to define 
within the documentary material itself unities, totalities, reveries, relations’ (Foucault 
1972, p7). There is no attempt to read beneath the document since he supposes that the 
document itself reveals at least as much – if not more – information about the ‘reality’ of 
the human agency and social practices involved in its formation as can positivistic, 
hermeneutic, or structuralist inquiries.  Furthermore, Foucault’s archaeology by staying 
 12 
much closer to the document, is less prone to the blindnesses exhibited by, and the 
distortions smuggled in by, other approaches as they endeavour to peer beneath the 
delicate surface specificity of the documents5.  
 
Once again there are important parallels in the manner in which ethnomethodology takes 
seriously the grossly accessible features of the world which its researchers inhabit. Whilst 
other social sciences operate as if they were archaeologists in another sense, 
‘reconstructing the society from its fragments and leftovers, for example, by analysing 
the contents of little used files collected by the many administrative organisations present 
in our society or pouring over tables of correlations’ (Sharrock & Hughes 2001) ethno-
inquries face up to the surplus of detail provided by actual events at hand. Yet this 
willingness to start investigations where the ‘researcher is at’, without using the highly 
technical and sophisticated methodologies which promise general explanations and 
models of larger social structures, leads to several misunderstandings. As Lynch and 
Bogen put it: 
 
Ethnomethdology's orientation to singular details is often misunderstood as an 
epistemological perspective that credits the existence of local, micro or 
immediately visible events and actions, while denying the existence of larger, or 
more abstract, social and cultural phenomena (e.g. Power, the state, demographic 
trends, structures of inequality, systems of meaning etc.) Such thinking mistakes an 
investigative orientation to a phenomenal field - held to be real, intelligible, 
studiable and largely unstudied in the human sciences- with a metaphysical stance 
to the effect that anything beyond the limits of that field is a doubtful construction. 
Such a view is belied by the overt and repeated insistence by ethnomethodologists 
that ordinary language concepts and commonsense knowledge for most part are not 
lesser forms of knowledge requiring scientific validation. Vernacular conceptions 
of power, knowledge, meaning, historical context and so forth, are ubiquitous.' 
From (Lynch 1996) 'The Spectacle of History', p272 
 
Interestingly Foucault’s work, by comparison, even though concerned with the minutiae 
of discipline, sexual practice or medical vision, has never been taken to be a micro-
history. It has been ethnomethodology in its preference for the everyday, mundane and 
blindingly obvious over the metaphysical, transcendental or invisible that has almost 
always taken to be a form of micro-sociology which really ought to be paired up with 
appropriate macro-sociologies to warrant any grander claims about society. Yet this 
would possibly be the worst combination possible since it is nearly always macro-
sociologies to which ethnomethodology stands in radical disjuncture. What we envisage 
here as a shared commitment in these two different inquiries is a concern for the minute, 
for the local details as, not subordinate to, but levelled with social order, with rules and 
regimes. 
 
                                                 
5 Although Foucault is at times quite scathing about such endeavours, it should be noted that his advocacy 
‘is not a way of saying that everyone else is wrong … [it is not] trying to reduce others to silence, by 
damning what they say as worthless’ (Foucault 1972 p17). His commitment is what Thrift (Thrift 1996; 
Thrift 2000) would describe as ‘modest theory’. 
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Neither Foucault nor ethno-inquiries use a priori definitions of power or order and then 
inspect the world to see if they can find their stipulated form of power there, and this has 
several consequences, some of which we will deal with here and some of which we will 
return to later. They start with the materials they have at hand and take those materials 
seriously for their part in the production of social order. 
 
In both Foucault and ethnomethodology, it is possible to locate an abiding common 
concern with the local production of institutional orders, even if ethnomethodology 
is more consciously ‘analytic,’ preferring to ‘say’ how socio-logical problems and 
their practical solutions work rather than to ‘show’ how they might, as possibilities. 
In this respect Foucault refers to ‘eventalisation’ (as opposed to generalization), 
whereas Garfinkel prefers to think of ‘invariance’ (Discourse) as a function or 
effect of contingency (discourse). Both, however, reject the idea that social practice 
is merely an effect of structurally given forms or ideal-rational rules behind the 
surface of visible action.’ (McHoul 1996) pp103-104 
 
The two approaches pursue cases where surface appearances are problematised but not by 
the theorist, rather by certain persons, groups, places (see Lemert & Gillan 1982 ‘strange 
beginnings’, ‘exceptional cases’). For Garfinkel (1967) Agnes as a candidate trans-sexual 
passing as a woman, for Sacks (1972) the police looking at the streets without trust in 
appearances. For Foucault – history provides for juxtapositions – the body of the 
condemned versus the confessional.  In a sense then both approaches rely not on a 
superbly clever abstract theorist thinking by themselves but rather on finding an often 
marginalised or specialised group for whom what has become taken for granted and 
unproblematic by most of us cannot be so for them. They then consult those people as 
serious experts in producing, say, mental illness or gender in the face of embodied, 
situational and practical difficulties. They do not treat these grounded experts’ accounts 
and experiences and documentation as mistaken or ideological, but rather as making 
certain (seemingly theoretical) problems particularly clear. By learning from those who 
deal with ‘theoretical’ problems as practical matters, perspicuous studies are provided for 
the purposes of vanquishing theory-driven sociologies/histories. In neither Foucault’s 
inquiries nor ethnomethodology’s studies do we then encounter a garden-variety 
empiricism which has never engaged with conceptual / grammatical / theoretical 
investigations. It is perhaps, though we would be wary of ushering all the troubles in that 
go with such a term, a kind of existential resolution to questions of possibility posed by 
theorists. A resolution which leaves the theorists, so often in a hurry to pose yet more 





Investigations must be done 
 
So ‘what next?’ How are we going to start our next study? Almost certainly we will begin 
without trying to define one of the mighty topics of critical inquiry such as ‘power’ or 
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‘reason’ or ‘justice’ or ‘community’. Turning to Lynch and Bogen again, (1996) p273 but 
this time on not being a priori: 
 
"We are not proposing an inquiry free of presuppositions; instead, we are 
disclaiming that our inquiry is theory-laden in the sense of being framed by a 
professionally fashioned nexus of definitions, propositions, and a priori 
expectancies. The promise of such an approach is to gain a more differentiated 
appreciation of the phenomena in question (and of their situated uses and fates) 
than we would gain if we were to address them as "concepts on holiday." This sort 
of inquiry is not intended to satisfy certain popular academic demands for 
explanations, critiques of power, and systematic theories, and we doubt that many 
of our colleagues in the human sciences would want to follow the sort of path we 
have taken." 
 
Foucault, as we have noted above, refused definitions of power as any kind of step 
toward revealing what power consists of and in what historical forms if was exercised. 
Even a small claim by a historian required the lengthy uncovering of its detailed 
architectures. Equally Sacks’s comments were that a definition of something as typically 
done in the social sciences was akin to erecting a headstone over a grave. Aside from 
burying the phenomenon, it in no way gave you the life that preceded the headstone’s 
erection. Avoiding stipulative treatments of social and historical phenomena is a central 
tenet of both approaches. In our investigations we will find ‘what next’ by encountering 
it, becoming immersed in it, living a life together, in short ‘becoming the phenomenon’. 
For us ‘what next?’ is not a call for definitions then, it is more like an invitation for 
something else to come along which we really do not yet know. Almost for us now an 
exclamation of surprise at what’s happened so far and what could possibly happen next 
(as in ‘whatever next!’) 
 
Garfinkel’s founding text ‘Studies in Ethnomethodology’ can be a puzzling read for 
anyone hoping to gut the theoretical organs out of it. The book, likes its founder, does not 
appear to have a heart6. Flicking through the chapters, you search in vain for definitions 
of social organisation, sexuality or explanations of suicide statistics. Most readers at that 
point abandon it, weary of its lack of headlines, models, three point summaries or Big 
Idea. For those that go on and read the chapters, or numerous other papers by 
ethnomethodologists (Goodwin 1997; Harper 1998; Lynch 1993; Orr 1996; Pollner 1987; 
Raffel 1979; Sacks 1972; Sharrock & Anderson 1994; Suchman 1987; Sudnow 1972), 
each seems to stand by itself, building to no greater picture. Ethnomethodology seems 
belligerently unwilling to offer the reader a position outside of the details of each 
empirically exhausting study; to offer a heart to pluck out. Equally one only has to 
browse through the pages of Foucault’s major texts, including the Archaeology of 
Knowledge, to realise that these are the creations of an historian sensitive in the last 
instance to the startlingly diverse substantive details encountered in the play of the 
historical record. Notwithstanding the attacks of some uncharitable critics, it is patently 
obvious that Foucault is far more interested in the colourful substantive nuances studding 
                                                 
6 Using a phrase from Deleuze and Guattari (1988b) it would be appropriate to describe Garfinkel as a 
‘body without organs’, and we mean this positively, if a little humourously. 
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the histories of madness, medical perception, the human sciences, carceral practices and 
sexuality than he is in producing the colourless and generalised notations of formal 
language systems. This state of affairs in Foucault’s project and ethnomethodology’s 
corpus is closely bound up with their complicated, if not to say, tense relation with 
theory.  
 
As Alan Sheridan declares; ‘Foucault does not have a theory of history, which he then 
sets about ‘proving’. The mass of detailed analysis he brings to bear in his work is not 
material to support a theory, in the sense that this analysis would be ‘invalidated’ if the 
theory were proved ‘false … For Foucault, theory does not enjoy the same status as 
detailed analysis, to which it is secondary, subservient.’ Harvey Sacks in his lectures on 
conversation (1992a,b) and Garfinkel (1964) in his breaching experiments constantly 
pushed their students toward doing practical exercises as ‘apprenticeships’ in analysis 
(see Lynch 1999), whenever they could they steered them away from abstract theory.  
 
Where Thrift has used dance to try and give a sense of where his non-representational 
project might lead us next, Harvey Sacks mentioned poetry as analogous to studies 
understood as non-generalisable, without existing classification into a discipline and 
unacceptable in a paraphrased form. 
 
"The upshot of what I've said is this: I make no commitment to what kind of 
placing anyone makes of what it is that I do, nor to whatever recommendations 
anyone might provide me, which turn on such a treatment. Now that will be very 
hard to accept, except under one condition: If I said I was maybe doing poetry, 
then, that one doesn't want to accept somebody's paraphrase, that one doesn't want 
to treat the various classifications that are available as locating it, as fully dealing 
with it and equivalent to it, is acceptable under perfectly conventional views of 
what poetry does. For example, Paul Valery, in his book on the art of poetry, gives 
a characterization of it which roughly is: You have a poem when nothing that's a 
paraphrase is equivalent to it; when you have to go back to the poem to find out 
what's in it.' Harvey Sacks, p621 'General Introduction' (to his lecture course) 
 
It is a simple point, and we have said it before several times ourselves, to see what 
Foucault is really doing, or Garfinkel and Sacks, you have to go back to their writings to 
see what are in them; you have to try do as they have done. They did not particularly 
want their work to be cited, they wanted to show how imaginative, insightful and 
surprising investigations could be done. It is a double imperative from both approaches 
not just to be faithful to sources in your reading but to be faithful in your studies to the 
places, events, occasions out of which they emerged. Never settling easily into the French 
or US university systems of teaching and researching, Foucault and Garfinkel kept doing 
their long, detailed empirical studies without which their other more programmatic claims 
were unwarranted. The commitment to painstaking investigations of this or that was 
directed to more than warranting grand claims about order, organisation, social facts. It 
was more than re-specifying inappropriately formulated problems of theory. To repeat 
ourselves: theirs was a practical demonstration of how research might and could be done; 
they were not exhibiting ideas, they were and are showing us how to think with the 
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materials we can find in archives and in motion all around us. They show commitments 
in each and every case to a messy, ugly, bright and beautiful world of creatures great and 
small. 
 
The ‘what next’ for us remains imperative and declarative: we must do social and 
historical investigations with already raised, blindingly obvious, sometimes strange and 
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